Sunday, 20 April 2025

The Assistant General Manager State Bank Of India & Anr. Vs. S. Saradamani - Hon'ble High Court summarized few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law

 HC Kerala (2021.05.25) The Assistant General Manager State Bank Of India & Anr. Vs. S.Saradamani [OP (CAT) NO.110 OF 2020]

Excerpts of the Order;

# 26. We now turn to the question whether the original applicant is entitled to resist recovery of the excess amount allegedly paid to her by mistake for the period prior to the span of three years from the date of discovery of the mistake, relying on the principles declared by the Apex Court in Rafiq Masih (supra).


# 27. The learned counsel for the original applicant contended that the principles laid down in Rafiq Masih (supra) are squarely applicable to the facts of this case. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the original applicant is not entitled to the benefit of Rafiq Masih (supra) in view of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court in Jagdev  Singh's case (supra). The learned counsel for the original applicant pointed out that in Jagdev Singh (supra), the Apex Court did not hold that the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra) was wrong and had only carved out a distinction in cases coming out of the second criterion of employees noted in paragraph 18 of the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra).


28. In State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (supra), in paragraph 18, the Apex Court held as follows : 

  • “18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship, which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to herein above, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law:

  • (i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class- IV service (or Group 'C' and Group 'D' service).

  • (ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery.

  • (iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued.

  • (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post.

  • (v) In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.”


29. In the subsequent decision in Jagdev Singh (supra), in paragraph 9, the Apex Court held as follows :

  • “9. The submission of the respondent, which found favour with the High Court, was that a payment which has been made in excess cannot be recovered from an employee who has retired from the service of the State. This, in our view, will have no application to a situation such as the present where an undertaking was specifically furnished by the officer at the time when his pay was initially revised accepting that any payment found to have been made in excess would be liable to be adjusted. While opting for the benefit of the revised pay scale, the respondent was clearly on notice of the fact that a future refixation or revision may warrant an adjustment of the excess payment, if any, made.”


# 30. The effect of the judgment in Jagdev Singh (supra) on the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra) was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala and others v. Vinod Kumar C.R. [2020 (4) KLT 230] and State of Kerala and others v. Abraham P.Joseph [2021 (2) KLT 288] and held that the Apex Court in Jagdev Singh (supra) has not interfered with the directions contained in paragraph 18 of the judgment in Rafiq Masih (supra)  regarding Clauses (i), (iii), (iv) and (v).


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Saturday, 19 April 2025

If nomination is substitute to testamentary succession

If nomination is a substitute to testamentary succession


Recently,  amendments were made in the banking laws about nomination facility for bank accounts & lockers facility, making provisions of multiple nominations, share of various nominees either successively or simultaneously.


Banking Laws (Amendment) Act, 2025.

(Appointed date 01.11.2025, Gazette Notification dated 22.10.2025)

# 10. In the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, in section 45ZA, - 

(a) in sub-section (1), for the words “one person”, the words “one or more persons not exceeding four, either successively or simultaneously” shall be substituted;

(b) after sub-section (1), the following sub-sections shall be inserted, namely: - 

  • “(1A) Where the nomination is made successively in favour of more than one person under sub-section (1), the nomination shall be effective only in favour of one person in the order of priority specified in section 45ZG.

  • (1B) Where the nomination is made simultaneously in favour of more than one person under sub-section (1), the nomination shall be effective in favour of all such persons in proportion to which it is declared, and the following terms and conditions shall apply, namely: - 

  • (a) the nomination shall not be made in favour of more than four persons;

  • (b) the nomination shall explicitly state the proportion of amount of deposit in percentage in favour of each nominee;

  • (c) the nomination shall be made in respect of the whole amount of deposit;

  • (d) if any nominee dies before receiving deposit from the banking company, the nomination in respect of such nominee alone shall become ineffective and the amount of deposit purported to be nominated in favour of deceased nominee shall be treated as if nomination had not been made in respect of that portion of deposit,

and any nomination which does not comply with any of the terms and conditions specified in clauses (a) to (c), shall be invalid, as if nomination had not been made by the depositor or all the depositors together, as the case may be.”.

# 11. In the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, in section 45ZC, in sub-section (1), for the words “one person”, the words “one or more persons not exceeding four, successively,” shall be substituted.

# 12. In the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, in section 45ZE, for sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely: - 

  • “(1) Where one or more individuals hire a locker from a banking company, whether such locker is located in the safe deposit vault of such banking company or elsewhere, the individual or, as the case may be, all the individuals together, may nominate one or more persons not exceeding four, successively, to whom, in the event of the death of the sole hirer or the death of all the hirers, the banking company may give access to the locker and liberty to remove the contents of the locker.”.

# 13. In the Banking Regulation Act of 1949, after section 45ZF, the following section shall be inserted, namely: - 

  • “45ZG. (1) Where the nomination is made in favour of more than one person successively under sub-section (1) of section 45ZA or sub-section (1) of section 45ZC or sub-section (1) of section 45ZE, the nomination shall be effective only in favour of one person in the following order of priority, namely: - 

  • (a) nomination of the first nominee shall be effective if that nominee survives the person or persons who made the nomination; 

  • (b) nomination of the second nominee shall become effective only after the death of the first nominee;

  • (c) nomination of any nominee lower in the order of nomination shall become effective only after the death of all the nominees whose names are higher in the order of nomination.

  • (2) Where the order of nomination is not mentioned, persons shall be deemed to have been nominated in the order in which their names appear in the nomination.

  • (3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to the nominations made simultaneously in favour of more than one person under sub-section (1) of section 45ZA.”.


For a common citizen, the nomination facility in the banking accounts & lockers facility in the banks, with the above amendments gives an impression that nomination is sufficient to define & settle the succession of one’s financial assets (bank deposits & valuables kept in lockers). However the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakti Yezdani vs Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar had ruled that nomination does not confer succession ownership rights on the nominee.


Thus to provide for clarity & to avoid unnecessary litigation amongst legal heirs of the depositor, the Indian Succession Act, 1925, may kindly be considered to be amended to treat the nominations, registered under the provisions of various statutes, as deemed will unless contrary is mentioned in the subsequent will of the depositor/testator.


Case Law;

Hon'ble Supreme Court (2023.12.14) in Shakti Yezdani vs Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar  [2023 INSC 1076, Civil Appeal  No. 7107 Of 2017] held that.

“# 25. In an illuminating list of precedents, this Court as well as several High Courts have dealt with the concept of ‘nomination’ under legislations like the Government Savings Certificate Act 1959, the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Life Insurance Act, 1939 and the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,  1952. It would be apposite to refer to what the Court said on nomination, in reference to these legislations:


Case Law/Precedent

Held

Sarbati Devi & Anr. v. Usha Devi [(1984) 1 SCC 424]


Nomination under S. 39 of the Insurance Act 1938 is subject to the claim of heirs of the assured under the law of succession.

Nozer Gustad Commissariat v. Central Bank of India [(1993) 1 Mah LJ 228]


Nomination under S. 10(2) of the EPF & Misc.  provisions Act 1952 cannot be made in favour of a non-family person. Relied upon Sarbati Devi (supra) to state that the principles therein were applicable to the Employees Provident Funds Act as well and not merely

restricted to the Insurance Act. 

Vishin N. Khanchandani & Anr. v. Vidya L. Khanchandani [(2000) 6 SCC 724]


Nominee entitled to receive the sum due on the savings certificate under S. 6(1) of the Govt. Savings Certificate Act 1959, but cannot utilise it. In fact, the nominee may retain the same for those entitled to it under the relevant law of succession.

Ram Chander Talwar & Anr. v. Devender Kumar Talwar & Ors. [(2010) 10 SCC 671]


Nomination made under provisions of S. 45ZA of the Banking Regulation Act 1949 entitled the nominee to receive the deposit amount on the death of the depositor.


# 26. A consistent view appears to have been taken by the courts, while interpreting the related provisions of nomination under different statutes. It is clear from the referred judgments that the nomination so made would not lead to the nominee attaining absolute title over the subject property for which such nomination was made. In other words, the usual mode of succession is not to be impacted by such nomination. The legal heirs therefore have not been excluded by virtue of nomination.

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# 39. The appellants also contend that a nomination validly made under S. 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 and Bye-law 9.11 of the Depositories Act, 1996 constitutes a ‘statutory testament’ that overrides testamentary/intestate succession. It is worth noting that the argument of nomination as a ‘statutory testament’ in respect of instruments such as life insurance policies, government savings certificates, provident fund etc. were considered and emphatically rejected by this Court in multiple rulings.

# 40. In Sarbati Devi (supra) this Court held that nomination under S. 39 of the Life Insurance Act, 1938 does not contemplate a third line of succession styled as a ‘statutory testament’ and any amount paid to a nominee on the policy holder’s death forms a part of the estate of the deceased policy holder and devolves upon his/her heirs, as per testamentary or intestate succession. Further, in Ram Chander Talwar (supra), while discussing the rights of a nominee of a deceased depositor (S. 45-ZA(2) Banking Regulation Act, 1949), this court concluded that the right to receive the money lying in the depositor’s account was to be conferred on the nominee but the nominee would not become the owner of such deposits. The said deposit is a part of the deceased depositor’s estate and is subject to the laws of succession, that governs the depositor.”

Disclaimer: The sole purpose of this blog is to create awareness on the subject and must not be used as a guide for taking or recommending any action or decision, commercial or otherwise. One must do his own research and seek professional advice if he intends to take any action or decision in the matters covered in this blog.


Tuesday, 10 December 2024

Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel Vs. Union of India and Ors - It is a well settled principle of law that where a citizen aggrieved by an action of the government department has approached the court and obtained a declaration of law in his/her favour, others similarly situated ought to be extended the benefit without the need for them to go to court.

 SCI (2024.12.09) in Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel Vs. Union of India and Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 1943 of 2022] held that;

  • It is a well settled principle of law that where a citizen  aggrieved by an action of the government department has approached the court and obtained a declaration of law in his/her favour, others similarly situated ought to be extended the benefit without the need for them to go to court.

  • Some of the excluded employees have not come to court. There is no justification to penalise them for not having litigated. They too shall be entitled to the same benefits as the petitioners. ….”

  • No doubt, in exceptional cases where the court has expressly prohibited the extension of the benefit to those who have not approached the court till then or in cases where a grievance in personam is redressed, the matter may acquire a different dimension, and the department may be justified in denying the relief to an individual who claims the extension of the benefit of the said judgment.

Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. This appeal challenges the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) Regional Bench, Lucknow dated 05.01.2022 in Original Application No. 241 of 2021. By the said order, the AFT dismissed the application of the appellant and declined her prayer for reliefs similar to the ones granted by the judgment dated 22.01.2014 of the AFT Principal Bench in O.A. No. 111 of 2013 and batch, to the applicants therein. The appellant claims that those applicants were identically situated with her. 


# 2. The appellant on 10.03.2008 was commissioned as a Short Service Commissioned Officer in the Army Dental Corps (AD Corps). She was at that time 27 years 11 months and 28 days of age. The regulation, as it then stood, entitled her to three chances for taking up the departmental examination for permanent commission. It also provided extension of age limit. The relevant clauses, namely, Para 12 of Army Instruction 15 of 79 and Para 4(a) and 4(b) of AI 37 of 78 read as under: 

  • “…Officers granted Short Service Commission will be given three chances for taking up the departmental examination for permanent commission. Two chances will be given after completion of 2 years of service and before completion of 4 years of service and third chance in extended tenure after completion of 5 years of service and before completion of 8 years of service provided they fulfill the conditions of eligibility as laid down in AI 37/78, as amended.” 


Paras 4(a) and 4(b) of Annexure ‘A’ to the AI 37/78 

  • “(a) Candidates must not have attained 28 years of age on 31st December of the year of receipt of application from them. This age limit may be extended upto 30 years by the Government of India on the recommendation of the AD Corps Selection Board in the case of candidates with additional PostGraduate qualifications. 3 (b) A candidate with previous commissioned service in the Army Dental Corps will be entitled to extension of the above age limits as given below:- Full period of previous reckonable service if such service was rendered while in possession of dental qualification recognized by the Dental Council of India (vide para 3 above).” (Emphasis supplied) 


# 3. It is undisputed that the appellant could not qualify in the first two chances on completion of two years of service and four years of service respectively. On 15.11.2012, her services were extended for another five years. By 9 th of March 2013 the appellant had completed five years of service and was eligible to avail of her third chance, subject to age relaxation up to the full period of reckonable service. 


# 4. However, on 20th of March, 2013, amendments were carried out to clause 4(a) and 4(b) of AI 37 of 78 as amended in AI 15 of 79, inasmuch as, while Para 4(a) was amended, Para 4(b) came to be deleted. The amended Para 4(a) of AI 37 of 78 introduced on 20.03.2013, reads as under: 

  • “(a) Para 4(a) of Annexure ‘A’ to AI 37/78 Candidates must not have attained 30 years of age on 31st December of the year of receipt of application form from them for Departmental Permanent Commission. The age limit may be extended up to 35 years in respect of those candidates who are in receipt of PG qualification of Masters in Dental Surgery duly recognized by Dental Council of India, at the time of initial commission to Army Dental Corps.” 


# 5. The net result was the appellant was deprived of her third chance since the extension was capped at 35 years and was confined to those who were in receipt of PG qualification of Masters in Dental Surgery on and from 20.03.2013. 


# 6. According to the appellant, Officers similarly situated with the appellant who were also not given an opportunity to appear for the clinical test and interview, in view of the amendment, quickly moved applications before the AFT, Principal Bench in O.A. No. 111 of 2013 and batch of matters raising various contentions and contended that they have been wrongly deprived of availing the third chance for no fault of theirs. Though the amendments to the policy were upheld, the Principal Bench of the AFT granted relief in the following terms in the said batch of matters. 

  • “35. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Government can grant age relaxation in the given facts and circumstances of the case. It is trite that the Government has the power to relax the upper age limit if it is found that operation of the rule or policy has hardship on the persons working in the Corps. Nothing has been shown that the Government has no power to relax the upper age limit. Now coming to the question as to whether the operation of the policy has hardship, it would be seen that an exception was provided for SSC Officers for giving the benefit by extending the upper age limit. It is also admitted by the respondents in para-41 of their counter that one time age relaxation in the upper age limit has been granted in the case of an AMC officer who had joined as SSC Officer prior to the issuance of the impugned amendment. By deletion of para-4(b) some of the SSC Officers became ineligible for permanent absorption. The petitioners, who were working in the Corps continuously, expected to be given three chances to seek their permanent absorption. However, due to impugned amendment, they have been denied these chances. Therefore, as one time exception, the Government can relax the upper age limit in respect of those petitioners who have become ineligible on account of the impugned amendment. 

  • 36. In view of the above discussions, all the four petitions stand partly allowed with following directions:- 

  • (1) The impugned policy of 2013 is held to be intra vires. 

  • (2) A direction isissued to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners, who were eligible in the year 2012 but became ineligible in the year 2013 for 6 grant of permanent absorption on account of amendment of policy after clubbing the selection of 2012 with 2013. Their case shall be considered in terms of the previous policy. 

  • (3) A further direction is issued to the respondents to grant one time age relaxation in favour of the petitioners for seeking permanent absorption as has been done in the case of AMC officers who had joined as SSC Officer prior to the issuance of the impugned amendment. The entire exercise for consideration of the petitioners for grant of permanent commission shall be completed within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioners’ case thereafter shall be considered by the ensuing Board for their permanent absorption in the Corps.” 


# 7. According to the appellant, she could not join the applicants therein in the litigation as she was in her advance stage of pregnancy and while posted at Bareilly, she proceeded on maternity leave on 16.05.2013. The appellant delivered a child on 01.07.2013. 


# 8. Consequent to the order of the Principal Bench, permanent commissions were granted to officers who were eligible prior to the amendment to avail a third chance but could not avail in view of the amendment of 20.03.2013. The appellant was not considered because she was not part of the Original Application. 


# 9. A representation submitted by the appellant on 06.09.2014 did not yield any favorable result and was rejected with the following endorsement on 15.09.2014:- 

  • “1. Ref advance copy of your application No DS12301/05/2004 dated 06 Sep 2014.

  • 2. As per directions of MoD communicated vide DGAFMS letter No12252/CC/AKJ/DGAFMS/LC dated 12 Aug 2014, hon'ble Armed Forces Tribunal (Principal Bench). New Delhi has granted ‘one time' age relaxation in the eligibility criteria 'only to the petitioners'. Hon'ble AFT has further clarified that this order will not form a precedence. 

  • 3. For your info please.” (Emphasis Supplied) 


# 10. At the outset itself, we may say that the phrase “Only to the Petitioners” in the order rejecting the representation is patently erroneous. While the AFT Principal Bench granted relief to the petitioners, it did not prohibit the department from considering similarly situated persons. Another representation was disposed of on 9 th November 2017, inter alia, on the primary ground that she did not meet the criterion. In the meantime, the appellant’s services were further extended for a period of 4 years on 31.10.2017.  


# 11. The appellant thereafter filed Original Application No. 241 of 2021 before the AFT, Regional Bench, Lucknow seeking relief similar to the ones granted to the batch of petitioners in O.A. 111 of 2013 by AFT, Principal Bench, New Delhi which attained finality. For the sake of completion of record, it should be mentioned that the appellant had in 2014 itself moved to the Armed Forces Tribunal by filing an application in Diary No. 1761of 2014. However, the said application was withdrawn with liberty to move afresh. Thereafter, again she filed O.A. 70 of 2017 before the Principal Bench which was again withdrawn with liberty to move the appropriate Tribunal. It was thereafter that after making the representation on 4 th October 2017 which was rejected on 09.11.2017 and after returning from the Arunachal Pradesh posting and further after the Covid-19 ordeal had reasonably subsided in January, 2021, she moved the AFT, Regional Bench, Lucknow by filing O.A. No. 241 of 2021, which has been dismissed by the impugned order.  


# 12. The only reasoning given in the impugned order is in the following terms. 

  • “(d) The applicant was not a petitioner in those petitions filed before AFT (PB), New Delhi, therefore, applicant cannot be granted any relief with regard to relaxation of age limit which is clarified by AFT (PB) in its judgment dated 22.01.2014 that ‘an officer is not entitled to be absorbed permanent, if he/she has crossed the upper age limits’. The benefit of age relaxation was granted to the petitioners of Original Applications who were eligible in the year 2012 but became ineligible in the year 2013 for grant of permanent absorption on account of amendment of policy after clubbing the selection of 2012 with 2013 considering the terms of the previous policy and were granted one time age relaxation.” 


# 13. We have heard Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. R Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel for the respondents. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsels and perused the records, we are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to parity with those applicants who succeeded before the AFT, Principal Bench in O.A. No. 111 of 2013. We say so for the following reasons. 


# 14. It is a well settled principle of law that where a citizen  aggrieved by an action of the government department has approached the court and obtained a declaration of law in his/her favour, others similarly situated ought to be extended the benefit without the need for them to go to court. [See Amrit Lal Berry vs. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and Others, (1975) 4 SCC 714] 


# 15. In K.I. Shephard and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 431, this Court while reinforcing the above principle held as under:- 

  • “19. The writ petitions and the appeals must succeed. We set aside the impugned judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Kerala High Court and direct that each of the three transferee banks should take over the excluded employees on the same terms and conditions of employment under the respective banking companies prior to amalgamation. The employees would be entitled to the benefit of continuity of service for all purposes including salary and perks throughout the period. We leave it open to the transferee banks to take such action as they consider proper against these employees in accordance with law. Some of the excluded employees have not come to court. There is no justification to penalise them for not having litigated. They too shall be entitled to the same benefits as the petitioners. ….” (Emphasis Supplied) 11 


# 16. No doubt, in exceptional cases where the court has expressly prohibited the extension of the benefit to those who have not approached the court till then or in cases where a grievance in personam is redressed, the matter may acquire a different dimension, and the department may be justified in denying the relief to an individual who claims the extension of the benefit of the said judgment. 


# 17. That is not the situation here. In the submissions too, the respondents have not been able to point out any valid justification as to how the applicants who obtained the benefit from the AFT, Principal Bench in OA No. 111 of 2013 and batch are not identically situated with the appellant. Like the applicants who succeeded, the appellant was also ripe for the third chance before the amended para 4(a) of AI No. 37 of 1978 was introduced on 20.03.2013. The Principal Bench of the AFT in OA No. 111 of 2013 after clearly holding that the applicants therein were denied the third chance directed consideration of their cases for permanent absorption by granting one-time age relaxation by considering them under the unamended policy. 


# 18. The respondent authorities on their own should have extended the benefit of the judgment of AFT, Principal Bench in OA No.111 of 2013 and batch to the appellant. To illustrate, take the case of the valiant Indian soldiers bravely guarding the frontiers at Siachen or in other difficult terrain. Thoughts on conditions of service and job perquisites will be last in their mind. Will it be fair to tell them that they will not be given relief even if they are similarly situated, since the judgment they seek to rely on, was passed in the case of certain applicants alone who moved the court? We think that would be a very unfair scenario. Accepting the stand of the respondents in this case would result in this Court putting its imprimatur on an unreasonable stand adopted by the authorities. 


# 19. The stand of the Department relying on the judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra and Another vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and Others, (1981) 4 SCC 130 to contend that mere reduction in chance of consideration did not result in deprivation of any right does not appeal to us. The appellant’s case is founded on the principle of discrimination. What is sauce for the goose ought to be sauce for the gander. If the applicants in O.A. No. 111 of 2013 whom we find are identically situated to the appellant were found to be eligible to be given a third chance for promotion, because they acquired eligibility before the amendment to AI No. 37 of 1978 on 20.03.2013, we find no reason why the appellant should not be treated alike. 


# 20. The order dated 13.03.2014 in the application for clarification of the AFT, Principal Bench, order of 22.01.2014 and the order dated 19.05.2014 in the review relied upon in the counter affidavit do not in any manner dilute the case of the appellant herein. In fact, the order dated 13.03.2014 fully supports the appellant since it extended the benefit to those persons who acquired the eligibility in 2013. As far as the order in review dated 19.05.2014 directing that there would be no dilution in the laid down criterion and the further direction that the order in review shall not form a precedent does not imply that the main order of 22.01.2014 of the Principal Bench, AFT, should not be extended to similarly situated individuals like the appellant, who has been knocking the doors for relief since September, 2014. 


# 21. We see no delay in the appellant approaching the Tribunal. The appellant has been seeking justice from 2014 and the only delay between 2017 to 2021 after the withdrawal of the earlier applications with liberty, was due to the fact that between August, 2017 and 2019 she was posted in Arunachal Pradesh and it was during this time that the appellant made a second representation. Thereafter, the period between March, 2020 and January, 2021 was on account of Covid-19 pandemic. In any event, since a clear case of discrimination has been made out, we do not want to non-suit the appellant on the ground of delay. We say so on the special facts of this case. 


# 22. We also find that the appellant - a woman officer has continuously worked since 2007 and even as late as on 31.10.2017, she was granted extension of another four years of service, and she continues to be in service thereafter also on account of the status quo granted by this Court on 08.03.2022. Not only this, the 15 appellant was awarded Commendation Card by the Chief of Army Staff on 14.01.2019. It is also undisputed that the appellant has had a distinguished service and is now posted as Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Dental Corps at Agra. 


# 23. We hold that the appellant was wrongly excluded from consideration when other similarly situated officers were considered and granted permanent commission. Today, eleven years have elapsed. It will not be fair to subject her to the rigors of the 2013 parameters as she is now nearly 45 years of age. There has been no fault on the part of the appellant. 


# 24. On the peculiar facts of this case and since nothing adverse has been placed on record with regard to performance of the appellant, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, we direct that the appellant ought to be given Permanent Commission. We direct that the appellant’s case be taken up for grant of Permanent Commission and she be extended the benefit of Permanent Commission with effect from the same date the similarly situated persons who obtained benefits pursuant to the judgment dated 22.01.2014 in O.A. No. 111 of 2013 of the Principal Bench of the AFT. All consequential benefits like seniority, promotion and monetary benefits, including arrears shall be extended to the appellant. The above directions shall be implemented within a period of four weeks from today. 


# 25. The appeal is allowed and the order of the AFT, Regional Bench, Lucknow, dated 05.01.2022 in O. A. No. 241 of 2021 is quashed and set aside. No costs. 

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